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# Kingfisher: a credible recovery, but the price needs more cash than the model finds

KGF, London Stock Exchange. Published September 22, 2026. Price as of the September 22, 2026 close. All share values are in pence (GBp).

## Verdict: HOLD at 343.70p (watchlist for new money)

Watchlist for new money, conditional hold for existing holders. The EBITDA multiple supports today's price, but conservatively normalized owner cash after rent and reinvestment does not.

- Bear value: 226.40p
- Base value: 295.77p (downside 13.9%)
- Bull value: 374.00p
- Expected value (30/50/20 weighting): about 290.60p
- Required margin of safety: 40%
- Maximum buy price: 177p (practical entry zone 163p to 177p)
- Operating owner cash implied by the price: about £429 million (Base £324 million)
- Business quality: 52/100
- Valuation score: 45/100
- Confidence: 17/25, grade C

Kingfisher's recovery is credible. On September 22, 2026, the owner of B&Q, Screwfix, Castorama and Brico Dépôt raised its FY2026/27 profit guidance, and the shares closed at 343.70p, up from 305.70p the day before. The question is whether that price is backed by cash that owners can actually take out of the business after rent, reinvestment and normal taxes.

On an EBITDA multiple, the shares look close to fair value. On conservatively normalized owner cash, they do not. My triangulated Base value is about 296p, 13.9% below the price, and the framework's maximum buy price is 177p. That entry price is a required safety threshold, not a forecast that the shares will fall there.

All share values are in pence (GBp), 100p = £1. Financial figures are in £ million. Route: SF-11 Retail and Consumer, mature European home improvement and trade retailer. Economic classification: Standard Company (3/12). Primary method: EV to normalized EBITDA after cash rent. Secondary method: DCF of post-rent, post-reinvestment operating owner cash. All values are present fair value estimates, not 12-month price targets.

## Why cash after rent is the test

Under IFRS 16, store rent disappears from EBITDA and reappears as lease debt. Comparing lease-excluded enterprise value with pre-rent EBITDA, or using raw operating cash flow minus capex, would overstate what shareholders earn. Both valuation methods here therefore work after cash rent, and lease debt is not deducted a second time.

Marketplace gross merchandise sales are not IFRS revenue, and the property estate is not added on top of the going-concern value, because those stores already produce the cash being valued. The dividend history does not meet the framework's long uninterrupted growth test, so Kingfisher is not treated as a dividend growth stock.

## Current financial performance

| Metric                                     | Value                                         |
|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| H1 2026/27 revenue                         | £6,864 million                                |
| H1 adjusted / statutory profit before tax  | £404 million / £400 million                   |
| H1 reported free cash flow                 | £339 million                                  |
| H1 group underlying like-for-like sales    | +0.3%                                         |
| H1 Screwfix / France like-for-like         | +5.6% / -2.3%                                 |
| FY2026/27 adjusted PBT guidance            | £595 to £635 million                          |
| FY2026/27 free cash flow guidance          | £480 to £520 million                          |
| Guided finance costs / tax rate / capex    | £105 million / 26% / £400 million             |
| FY2025/26 revenue / free cash flow / capex | £12,945 million / £512 million / £388 million |

Trade is 31% of sales and e-commerce 22%. The marketplace contributed £13.4 million of H1 retail profit out of £489 million, promising but too small to redefine the group's cash economics. The business character is unchanged: a retailer with a gradually improving trade and online mix, not a software or platform company.

## Shares, cash and leases

| Bridge at July 31, 2026                                  | £ million |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Cash, less overdraft, plus short-term deposits           | 410       |
| Less bank loan, fixed-term debt and financing derivative | -101      |
| Net financial cash                                       | 309       |
| Less post-balance buybacks                               | -7        |
| Valuation financial cash proxy                           | 302       |
| Lease liabilities (not deducted again)                   | 2,240     |

Other cash movements since July are unknown, not proven to be zero. A £100 million cash shortfall would lower the Base value by 5.96p.

On August 31, 2026, Kingfisher had about 1,649 million shares in issue with no treasury shares. The model adds the 30 million incremental award shares from the H1 diluted average and uses 1,679 million as a conservative diluted count. A 2% lower share count only lifts the Base value to 301.81p. Average diluted shares fell from about 1,867 million in FY2024/25 to 1,776 million in FY2025/26, so buybacks are shrinking the denominator.

Of the new £300 million buyback programme, £125 million was completed across two tranches at an average of about 292.2p, close to this model's Base value. The remaining £175 million is not credited to value without also subtracting its cash cost.

## From reported free cash flow to owner cash

Reported free cash flow is a legitimate company measure, but not automatically a perpetual distributable figure. For FY2025/26:

| FY2025/26                                       | £ million |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Operating cash flow                             | 1,433     |
| Less net cash rental payments                   | -508      |
| Add net non-lease interest                      | 23        |
| Less total capex                                | -388      |
| Less tax refund already excluded by the company | -64       |
| Cash flow after adjusting-item cash costs       | 496       |
| Less stock-based compensation                   | -27       |
| Hard owner cash before normalization            | 469       |

Company-reported FCF of £512 million adds back £16 million of adjusting-item cash costs to the £496 million, so hard cash is 91.6% of reported FCF before further normalization. The £64 million refund is not deducted twice. The H1 equivalent is £298 million, which is not annualized because demand, inventory and tax payments are seasonal.

| £ million                      | FY23/24 | FY24/25 | FY25/26 |
|--------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| Company FCF                    | 514     | 511     | 512     |
| Less adjusting-item cash costs | 21      | 23      | 16      |
| Less SBC                       | 22      | 20      | 27      |
| Hard cash before normalization | 471     | 468     | 469     |
| Less working capital inflow    | 118     | 108     | 74      |
| Extra tax normalization        | 36.4    | 38.8    | 82.6    |
| After-tax one-off rates refund | 0       | 23.8    | 0       |
| Normalized owner cash          | 316.6   | 297.4   | 312.4   |

The three-year mean is £308.8 million. These are analyst normalization estimates, not restated accounts: working capital releases are stripped out and cash tax is normalized toward adjusted pretax profit. Actual capex in these years averaged £356 million, but the forward model keeps the higher £400 million company plan. The largest judgment is tax: favourable cash tax timing and continued inventory improvements could persist longer than assumed, while restocking could consume cash.

## Forward normalization

| £ million                                     | Value  |
|-----------------------------------------------|--------|
| FY2026/27 adjusted PBT guidance midpoint      | 615    |
| Add guided net finance costs                  | 105    |
| Add estimated depreciation and amortization   | 670    |
| EBITDA before cash rent                       | 1,390  |
| Less one-off business rates refund            | -14    |
| Less estimated net cash rent                  | -510   |
| Less recurring economic adjusting cash charge | -25    |
| Normalized EBITDA after cash rent             | 841    |
| Other noncash adjustments excluding SBC       | 35     |
| Pension and provision cash                    | -5     |
| Normalized cash tax (26% of £566 million)     | -147.2 |
| Full capex                                    | -400   |
| Working capital                               | 0      |
| Operating owner cash flow                     | 323.8  |
| Add net financial income after tax            | 7.4    |
| Equity owner cash flow                        | 331.2  |

The gap between £500 million of guided FCF and £331 million of normalized equity cash is not a company reconciliation. It is the output of an independent normalization model, and the future split between working capital and tax is exactly the unverified input behind the Confidence C grade.

## Primary valuation: EBITDA after cash rent

The Base multiple of 6.5x sits in the framework's 5x to 8x low band for this retail subtype. Low group returns, mature growth and cyclical demand justify a lower multiple than a high-return stable retailer. It is applied to a rent-adjusted metric and must not be compared mechanically with published IFRS 16 EBITDA multiples. The same 6.5x is used in every scenario to isolate operating performance.

£841 million times 6.5 gives an operating value of £5,466.5 million. Adding £302 million of net financial cash gives equity of £5,768.5 million, or **343.57p** per diluted share. At the market price, the implied multiple is 6.503x, so the multiple method alone says the shares are about fairly priced. The caution comes from cash conversion, not from an extreme multiple.

## Secondary valuation: owner cash DCF

The second method discounts £323.8 million of operating owner cash, growing 2% a year, at a 10% required return, a post-rent hurdle for the operating business rather than the company's reported WACC.

| Model year                      | 1     | 2     | 3     | 4     | 5     |
|---------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Operating owner cash, £ million | 330.3 | 336.9 | 343.7 | 350.5 | 357.6 |

The present value of the five explicit years is £1,298.4 million and of the terminal value £2,830.6 million, for an operating value of £4,129.0 million. Adding the same £302 million of net cash gives equity of £4,431.0 million, or **263.90p** per share. The terminal value is 68.6% of operating value, below the framework's 75% warning threshold but still important.

## Historical and peer cross-check

A synchronized, lease-consistent historical multiple series is not available, and neither is a current peer panel on the same basis. No historical median, percentile or peer discount is claimed. The roughly 292p average price of completed 2026 buybacks is historical execution evidence, not an intrinsic value benchmark. The historical component of the valuation score is therefore zero.

## Valuation triangulation

The EBITDA method receives 40% and the owner cash DCF 60%. The multiple reflects the operating recovery, but rent, tax timing and capex decide what can actually be distributed.

| Scenario | Primary | Secondary | Triangulated value |
|----------|---------|-----------|--------------------|
| Bear     | 288.98p | 184.67p   | 226.40p            |
| Base     | 343.57p | 263.90p   | 295.77p            |
| Bull     | 405.12p | 353.25p   | 374.00p            |

The Base divergence of 26.2% sits in the warning band. It is not solved by raising the cash forecast until the methods agree, and it lowers valuation robustness.

## What is the market already pricing in?

| Reverse question                                    | At 343.70p     | Own Base       |
|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Required EBITDA after rent at 6.5x                  | £841.3 million | £841.0 million |
| Required operating owner cash at 10% and 2%         | £428.9 million | £323.8 million |
| Perpetual growth if owner cash stays £323.8 million | 3.85%          | 2.00%          |
| Cash required with the primary method fixed         | £429.0 million | £323.8 million |

The market and the Base case agree on the earnings needed by the multiple method. The disagreement is cash: the price requires about 32% more sustainable owner cash than the Base model. That is not absurd, because a guidance-centered case reaches almost exactly that amount. The real debate is whether it lasts, which is why a low forward P/E does not settle the question.

Diluted valuation capitalization at 343.70p is about £5,770.7 million, or £5.67 billion on ordinary shares in issue, and the post-rent operating enterprise value is £5,468.7 million.

## Bear, base and bull scenarios

| £ million unless stated | Bear    | Base    | Bull    |
|-------------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| Probability             | 30%     | 50%     | 20%     |
| Revenue                 | 12,800  | 13,200  | 13,800  |
| EBITDA after cash rent  | 700     | 841     | 1,000   |
| EBITDA margin           | 5.47%   | 6.37%   | 7.25%   |
| Cash tax                | 110.5   | 147.2   | 188.5   |
| Operating owner cash    | 219.5   | 323.8   | 441.5   |
| Equity owner cash       | 226.9   | 331.2   | 448.9   |
| Triangulated value      | 226.40p | 295.77p | 374.00p |
| vs 343.70p              | -34.1%  | -13.9%  | +8.8%   |

**Bear** assumes weaker demand and cost absorption, taking EBITDA down £141 million. **Bull** assumes better sales mix and operating leverage across the current footprint, lifting it £159 million. Taxes move by 26% of each EBITDA change, and capex of £400 million, the 6.5x multiple, the 10% return, 2% growth, £302 million of cash and 1,679 million shares stay the same in every case, so no scenario gets free buybacks or a financing benefit. An extra £50 million of annual capex lowers any triangulated value by 22.78p. A structural franchise failure or refinancing crisis would need a separate, more severe analysis.

The probability-weighted value is **290.60p**. The modest Bull upside from today's price is an investment warning, not proof that a stronger recovery cannot happen.

### Sensitivity

| Primary: EBITDA after rent | 5.5x    | 6.5x    | 7.5x    |
|----------------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| £700 million               | 247.29p | 288.98p | 330.67p |
| £841 million               | 293.48p | 343.57p | 393.66p |
| £1,000 million             | 345.56p | 405.12p | 464.68p |

| Secondary: required return | 1% growth | 2% growth | 3% growth |
|----------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 9%                         | 261.49p   | 299.04p   | 349.09p   |
| 10%                        | 234.44p   | 263.90p   | 301.79p   |
| 11%                        | 212.79p   | 236.58p   | 266.32p   |

## Where the stock becomes attractive

| Margin of safety component                | Points |
|-------------------------------------------|--------|
| Confidence C starting point               | 35     |
| Retail cyclicality and operating leverage | +5     |
| Required margin of safety                 | 40%    |

Applied to the 295.77p Base value, the maximum buy price is **177p** (177.46p before rounding). A 45% discount gives a stronger reference of 163p, so the practical entry zone is **163p to 177p**. Buying below it still requires checking why the price fell. At 343.70p, the shares are far above that zone.

No extra lease haircut is applied after rent is charged, and no separate penalty is added for each symptom of the same cyclical risk. Under the framework's bands, a Base value 13.9% below the price classifies the stock as fairly valued, close to the expensive boundary, but without the required margin of safety.

## Dividend and capital returns

The annual dividend is 12.4p, and a new interim of 3.8p goes ex-dividend on October 8 and is paid on November 13, 2026. The run-rate yield at 343.70p is 3.61%. The dividend was flat at 12.4p from FY2021/22 to FY2025/26 and the FY2019/20 final was cancelled, so this is an income-paying retailer, not a dividend aristocrat.

On about 1,649 million shares, the dividend costs about £204.5 million, a 62% payout of Base equity owner cash with 1.62x cover. In the Bear case the payout rises to about 90%. A £300 million buyback plus the dividend needs about £504 million, more than Base owner cash. Near-term reported FCF can fund that package, but repeating it indefinitely would need better recurring cash, smaller buybacks or balance sheet resources. That is a capital allocation caution, not a prediction of a dividend cut.

## Reasons to own or follow Kingfisher

- **Trade distribution and fulfilment.** Repeat repair and professional purchasing can support a more resilient franchise than purely discretionary project spending.
- **Incremental profit potential.** Better sourcing, digital monetization and improved French execution could lift profit without proportional investment in new stores.
- **Capital returns and resilience.** Buybacks have actually reduced the share count, the dividend is covered in Base, and the balance sheet holds net financial cash with investment-grade ratings.

These are reasons to hold or monitor the business, not a substitute for an attractive entry price.

## What could go wrong?

- **Recurring cash disappoints.** Normalized owner cash below about £230 million, or evidence that the recovery depends on temporary releases, would undermine the Base distribution capacity.
- **Sector and operations.** A prolonged home improvement downturn, aggressive competition or worse economics in France and Poland could reverse operating leverage, and leases do not shrink with sales.
- **Balance sheet and allocation.** Dividends plus repeated buybacks above sustainable cash can erode flexibility, and net financial cash does not remove £2.24 billion of lease commitments.
- **Management transition.** Succession could interrupt the operating programme or change buyback discipline.

## Business quality and returns

The latest audited group ROCE was 8.2% against an 8.4% WACC, up from 7.4% against 8.8% a year earlier. By region, UK and Ireland earned 15.5%, France 4.4% and Poland 6.1%. Even on the company's basis, group value creation is not yet comfortably above its capital cost. Reported revenue grew only about 1.0% a year from FY2020/21 to FY2025/26, a reported perimeter comparison affected by disposals.

Liquidity and credit are not the main Bear thesis. Lease-inclusive net debt to adjusted EBITDA is 1.4x, and the company reports investment-grade ratings and committed liquidity. Store rent and consumer cyclicality matter more than a refinancing cliff.

## Management execution

Adjusted PBT of £528 million in FY2024/25 landed inside the final £510 to £540 million guidance, and £560 million in FY2025/26 inside £540 to £570 million. Cash buybacks were about £160 million, £225 million and £256 million over the last three years. Execution is visible, but value creation depends on the purchase price, and the current programme's average of about 292p is close to Base value rather than a deep discount.

CEO Thierry Garnier announced his resignation in May 2026 and remains in the role during a notice period while a successor is sought. No exact departure date is assumed.

| Management credibility        | Score |
|-------------------------------|-------|
| Guidance execution            | 4/5   |
| Cash and capital discipline   | 3/5   |
| Capital return execution      | 2/3   |
| Strategic operating delivery  | 3/4   |
| Governance and continuity     | 2/3   |
| Total: good, with limitations | 14/20 |

## Stock Analyza scorecard

| Business quality                    | Score  |
|-------------------------------------|--------|
| Moat and pricing power              | 11/20  |
| Economic return versus capital cost | 4/20   |
| Balance sheet and resilience        | 12/15  |
| Earnings and cash quality           | 8/15   |
| Growth and reinvestment runway      | 6/15   |
| Management and capital allocation   | 7/10   |
| Dilution and governance alignment   | 4/5    |
| Total                               | 52/100 |

| Valuation                            | Score  |
|--------------------------------------|--------|
| Discount to triangulated Base value  | 18/40  |
| Protection versus Bear value         | 6/20   |
| Cross-method convergence             | 9/15   |
| Historical relative valuation        | 0/10   |
| Market-implied expectation asymmetry | 8/10   |
| Data and model quality               | 4/5    |
| Total                                | 45/100 |

| Economic classification                 | Points |
|-----------------------------------------|--------|
| Five-year normalized return on capital  | 0/2    |
| Five-year revenue CAGR (about 1.0%)     | 0/2    |
| Five-year normalized FCF per share CAGR | 0/2    |
| Balance sheet                           | 1/1    |
| Exceptional unit economics              | 0/1    |
| Repeat economics                        | 1/2    |
| Reinvestment runway                     | 1/2    |
| Total: Standard Company                 | 3/12   |

## Confidence score

| Confidence                  | Score          |
|-----------------------------|----------------|
| Data quality and provenance | 4/5            |
| Business predictability     | 3/5            |
| Valuation robustness        | 3/5            |
| Accounting transparency     | 4/5            |
| Scenario dispersion         | 3/5            |
| Total                       | 17/25, grade C |

Better verified recurring cash and exact capital bridges could raise confidence. A more attractive share price cannot.

## What I would watch from here

### Green

- FY2026/27 adjusted PBT of at least £595 million on a stable definition
- Normalized equity owner cash of at least £330 million with a credible tax and working capital bridge
- Group underlying like-for-like sales at zero or better
- Screwfix like-for-like of +3% or more, France at zero or better
- Group ROCE more than 1 point above WACC
- Lease-inclusive net leverage at or below 1.7x
- Dividend payout of owner cash below 70%
- An orderly CEO succession with a coherent strategy

### Yellow

- Adjusted PBT of £565 to £594 million, or heavier adjustments
- Normalized owner cash of £230 to £329 million
- Group like-for-like between -2% and zero, Screwfix between zero and +3%, France between -4% and zero
- ROCE within 1 point of WACC
- Net leverage of 1.7x to 2.2x
- Payout of 70% to 90%, or recurring cash adjustments of £25 to £50 million
- Prolonged succession uncertainty or a capital policy shift

### Red

- Adjusted PBT below £565 million or repeated guidance cuts
- Owner cash below £230 million for two annual periods
- Group like-for-like below -2%, Screwfix negative or France below -4% for two quarters
- ROCE more than 1 point below WACC for two years
- Net leverage above 2.2x or a liquidity or covenant event
- Payout above 90% sustained, or a dividend cut
- An abrupt management departure together with strategic or financial deterioration

The next scheduled review point is the Q3 trading update, provisionally set for November 24, 2026.

## The three most important thesis breakers

1.  Persistently inadequate normalized owner cash.
2.  A failed regional recovery that pushes group returns materially below the cost of capital.
3.  Capital returns that erode financial resilience instead of growing per-share value.

## Adversarial review

The formulas were recomputed through a separate high-precision code path, and a second review challenged the economic assumptions, including the strongest case for owning the shares. All 88 arithmetic checks passed. The review rejected a stale quote on the issuer's own share price page, kept pence and pounds apart, applied rent, lease debt and interest consistently, avoided deducting the £64 million refund twice, and kept the 26% gap between the methods rather than forcing agreement. No historical or peer medians were invented, unspent buybacks were not credited as free value, and property value was only tested together with the rent a sale would add.

The strongest counter-thesis is that working capital discipline and favourable cash taxes are durable, so the Base normalization is too harsh. Starting from £500 million of guided FCF and deducting only recurring adjustments, SBC, the one-off refund and financial income gives about £427 million of operating cash and a value of **342.88p**, almost exactly the price. It is not the Base case because the persistence of those tax and working capital benefits is precisely what remains unverified.

The most generous tested case, with the top of profit and FCF guidance, an 8x multiple and a 9% return, reaches 414.97p. Even with a lenient 25% margin of safety that gives about 311p, still below 343.70p.

| Robustness test                                                  | Triangulated value |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| Base                                                             | 295.77p            |
| Consensus-centered (July 2, 2026 dataset)                        | 284.95p            |
| Guidance cash fully recurring                                    | 342.88p            |
| Required return 9%                                               | 316.85p            |
| Required return 11%                                              | 279.38p            |
| Annual capex £350 million                                        | 318.55p            |
| Annual capex £450 million                                        | 272.99p            |
| Diluted shares -2%                                               | 301.81p            |
| Net financial cash -£100 million                                 | 289.81p            |
| Cash taxes £20 million lower / higher                            | 304.88p / 286.66p  |
| Illustrative £1 billion sale and leaseback with £80 million rent | 315.97p            |
| Generous published-input case                                    | 414.97p            |

No new buy is justified under the entry margin in any of these tests. The consensus-centered case uses the issuer-hosted July 2, 2026 dataset (mean PBT £580 million, FCF £473 million), which predates the upgrade. The annual report values the occupied sale and leaseback property estate at about £2.8 billion, but those stores already produce the cash being valued. Adding it on top would count it twice, and an illustrative £1 billion sale with £80 million of new rent lifts value only to about 316p. The publication gate status is PASS_WITH_WARNING because forward rent and cash tax assumptions, spot capital structure precision and missing comparison datasets remain real uncertainties.

## Final verdict: hold at 343.70p, watchlist for new money

For an existing position, an unchanged operating thesis can support holding rather than an automatic sale, because the EBITDA valuation and a favourable cash conversion reading both support roughly the current price. For new money, the price does not offer the framework's required margin of safety.

**Verdict: HOLD at 343.70p, WATCHLIST for new money. Triangulated Base value 295.77p, downside 13.9%, required margin of safety 40%, maximum buy price 177p.**

Verified recurring operating owner cash of around £430 million would bring the cash method up to the market price, and sustained better group returns would lift both value and confidence. Owner cash falling structurally below the Bear range, or buybacks funded by weakening financial capacity, would lower the valuation.

The main thesis breaker is failure to turn the operating recovery into sustainable cash after rent and reinvestment. A low forward adjusted P/E or an unchanged dividend does not override that test.

## Sources

Primary sources include Kingfisher's [half year results to July 31, 2026](https://www.kingfisher.com/~/media/Files/K/Kingfisher-Plc/Universal/investors/result-reports-presentation/2026/2026-half-year-results.pdf), [Annual Report 2025/26](https://www.kingfisher.com/~/media/Files/K/Kingfisher-Plc/Universal/investors/result-reports-presentation/2026/2526-annual-report-and-accounts.pdf), [Annual Report 2024/25](https://www.kingfisher.com/~/media/Files/K/Kingfisher-Plc/Universal/investors/result-reports-presentation/2025/Kingfisher-Annual-Report-2024-25.pdf), [technical guidance](https://www.kingfisher.com/investors/technical-guidance), [dividend history](https://www.kingfisher.com/investors/shareholder-centre/dividends), [directorate change announcement](https://www.kingfisher.com/media/news/2026/directorate-change), [liquidity and ratings](https://www.kingfisher.com/investors/debt-investors/liquidity-and-ratings) and the [investor calendar](https://www.kingfisher.com/investors). Share count and buyback data come from Kingfisher's regulatory announcements on total voting rights, admission to trading and share repurchases (August 31 and September 3, 2026). The consensus check uses the [issuer-hosted consensus](https://www.vuma.com/public/consensus/KGF/fy26) last updated July 2, 2026.

The reference market price is the 343.70p closing auction trade at 4:35 pm BST on September 22, 2026, from London South East. Balance sheet figures are as of July 31, 2026.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided solely for research and educational purposes. It is not personalized investment, financial, legal or tax advice. Fair values and entry thresholds are estimates. Investors can lose part or all of their invested capital.

Framework: SF-11, home improvement retail subtype. Economic class: Standard Company. Engine: STANDARD, EV to EBITDA after cash rent with owner cash DCF cross-check. Confidence: C/17. Data status and adversarial gate: PASS_WITH_WARNING. Version: Master v3.1.