# ProCredit: half of book value, priced for a 7% return that never improves PCZ, Xetra. Published October 6, 2026. Values in euros. Price as of the October 5, 2026 Xetra close. ## Verdict: HOLD at €8.68 Watchlist for new money. The shares trade 34% below my Base value of €13.08 and at 0.47 times book value, but return on equity is 6.7% and the cost-income ratio is 71.2%, and both are red flags in the bank framework. With a required margin of safety of 50%, the buy zone is €6.54 or below. - Bear value: €5.98 - Base value: €13.08 - Bull value: €21.11 - Upside to base value: +50.7% - Maximum buy price: €6.54 - Required margin of safety: 50% - Price to book value / tangible book value (June 30, 2026): 0.47x / 0.50x - Return on tangible equity, first half 2026: 7.3% - CET1 capital ratio: 12.7% (requirement 10.4%) - Business quality: 56/100 - Valuation score: 53/100 - Confidence: 14/25, grade C At 0.47 times book value, ProCredit looks like the classic cheap bank. The framework I use for banks says such a discount is acceptable only if return on equity is above 10%. ProCredit earned 6.7% in the first half and guides to about 7% for 2026. The price is what a bank earning 7% forever is worth. My Base value assumes the return climbs to about 10.5%, and that is the whole argument. At the October 5, 2026 Xetra close of €8.68 the shares trade 33.6% below my triangulated Base value of €13.08, an upside of 50.7%. The Bear value of €5.98 is 31.2% below the price and the Bull value of €21.11 is 143% above it. The required margin of safety (MOS) is 50%, so the maximum buy price is €6.54, about 25% under the market. The stock is attractive on the numbers and not yet attractive on the evidence, which is why the verdict is Hold. Route: SF-02 Banks. Economic classification: Standard (5/12). Primary method: residual income on tangible and book equity, with the return on equity measured against a cost of equity. Secondary method: forward price to earnings. Corporate free cash flow is not a valid metric for a bank and is not used. Per share values use 58,898,492 shares. Values are present fair value estimates, not 12 month price targets. All figures are in euros. ## What ProCredit is ProCredit Holding is the German parent of a group of banks that lend to small and medium businesses and increasingly to private clients through mobile apps. The loan portfolio was €8,370 million at June 30, 2026 (up 8.0% in six months) and deposits were €9,337 million. By segment, South Eastern Europe earned €45.9 million in the first half (return on equity 10.6%), Eastern Europe €17.5 million (12.2%), South America €1.0 million, and Germany plus consolidation cost €26.0 million, because the holding and the IT and digital build sit there. Three events shape the picture. In March 2026 the group agreed to sell its majority stake in ProCredit Bank Ecuador, subject to local approval; management expects a negative result effect in the high single digit to low double digit million range. In May it issued an inaugural Additional Tier 1 bond of €148.5 million. And two taxes weigh on 2026 profit: a 50% profit tax rate on Ukrainian banks and a higher bank levy in Romania until December 2026. The group tax rate in the first half was 31.9%. ## The latest half-year | First half 2026 (to June 30, 2026) | Result | | --- | --- | | Net interest income | €191.3 million, up 11.6%. Net interest margin 3.3% (3.2% in 2025) | | Net fee and commission income | €44.0 million, down 6.5% (euro introduction in Bulgaria, SEPA effects) | | Operating income | €227.2 million, up 6.6% | | Costs and cost-income ratio | Personnel and administrative expenses €161.7 million, up 7.0%. Cost-income ratio 71.2% (full year 2025: 73.4%) | | Loss allowances | €9.0 million, cost of risk 22 basis points (15 at year-end). Management's medium-term targets assume 30 to 35 basis points | | Profit | €38.5 million (first half 2025: €47.0 million). Earnings per share €0.65, before the AT1 coupon | | Returns | Return on equity 6.7% (annualised, total equity including AT1). Return on tangible equity 7.3% (common equity, after coupons) | | Capital | CET1 ratio 12.7% (13.1% at year-end), Tier 1 14.7%, total capital 17.8%. Requirements are 10.4%, 12.6% and 15.7% | | Credit quality | Defaulted loans 2.9% (3.0%). Stage 3 coverage 41.3% (44.5%). Stage 2 loans €713 million, 8.5% of the portfolio (6.5% at year-end) | | 2026 outlook (confirmed) | Loan growth 12% to 15%, return on equity around 7%, cost-income ratio around 73.4%, CET1 ratio around 13% at year-end, one third of profit paid as dividend | Medium-term targets are a loan portfolio above €10 billion, a cost-income ratio near 57% and a return on equity of 13% to 14% (company-hosted research cites 2029 as the year). Management sees a further 1.5 percentage points of upside from a reconstruction of Ukraine, which I do not use. The year-end cost-income guide of about 73% implies a second half near 75%, because the Ecuador sale and ongoing investment come through then (my arithmetic, assuming similar income in both halves). ## Which return on equity matters For a bank the hardest honest metric is the return earned on the equity that belongs to ordinary shareholders. The headline 6.7% is not that. It divides profit by total equity including the €148.5 million AT1 bond and does not subtract the bond's coupon. The 7.3% return on tangible equity removes intangibles and the AT1 and deducts expected coupons, so it is the better measure for ordinary shareholders. I use it, and I model profit to ordinary shareholders after the coupon. The interim report says coupons of €6.181 million are expected in December 2026 for the period from May 29 to December 3. That works out to a rate of about 8.1% and roughly **€12 million a year**, or about €0.20 per share, that ranks ahead of ordinary holders (my arithmetic from the stated amount). The first half earnings per share of €0.65 does not yet include it. Two of the five red flags the bank framework lists are active today: a return on equity persistently below 8%, and a cost-income ratio above 70%. Non-performing loans are under 4% and Tier 1 capital is well above 10%, so those flags are off. The framework also says that a price under 0.8 times tangible book is acceptable only if return on equity is above 10% and non-performing loans are below 3%. ProCredit meets the second condition and not the first. ## Book value, capital and asset quality Equity attributable to ordinary shareholders was €1,084.9 million on June 30, 2026, which is **€18.42 per share**. After €53.0 million of intangible assets it is **€17.52 of tangible book value per share**. The AT1 bond is excluded because it is not common equity. There are no treasury shares and basic and diluted earnings per share are identical, so there is no dilution to model. Equity rose only €10.8 million in the half, because the €27.7 million dividend (€0.47 a share) absorbed most of the profit. Capital is adequate but not abundant. The CET1 ratio of 12.7% is 2.3 percentage points above the requirement, about €178 million. In the half, risk-weighted assets grew 6.1% to €7,738 million while CET1 capital grew 3.1% to €985 million. Management guides to about 13% at year-end even with loan growth of 12% to 15% and a payout of one third. At a 7% return a retention of two thirds adds about 4.7% a year to equity, which cannot match loan growth of that size on its own, so the guide depends on the Ecuador sale and balance sheet optimization (my inference, ESTIMATED). Liquidity is strong: liquidity coverage ratio 154.7% and net stable funding ratio 143.6%, while the loan to deposit ratio rose from 84.9% to 89.6% because loans grew 8.0% and deposits 2.2%. Credit quality is stable but the direction needs watching. The share of defaulted loans is 2.9%, yet Stage 2 loans rose 41% to €713 million, including €114.8 million of exposures tied to the Middle East conflict that were moved there, and Stage 3 coverage fell 3.2 points to 41.3%. Loss allowances are €191.7 million (2.3% of loans) and include €48.8 million of management overlays. Collateral coverage is not shown in the half-year report (UNAVAILABLE), so I do not read the low Stage 3 coverage as a loss. ## Primary valuation: residual income A bank is worth its book value plus the present value of the profit it earns above its cost of equity. The model starts at €18.42 of book value per share on June 30, 2026, runs the second half of 2026 and then fiscal years 2027 to 2031, applies a one third payout (company policy), and adds a terminal value at the end of 2031. Cost of equity is **11.5%** and terminal growth **3.0%**, held the same in all scenarios so that risk is not counted twice. Both are my estimates: the shares have a beta near 1.4 and the group operates in Eastern Europe and Ukraine. The Base return path (on ordinary equity, after the AT1 coupon) is 6.6% for the second half of 2026, then 7.5%, 9.0%, 10.0%, 10.5% and 10.5% for 2027 to 2031, with a terminal return of 10.0%. That is about halfway between today's 7.3% and the 13.5% midpoint of management's target. I do not give management's full target in the Base. | Base path, per share | Return | Book value, start | Profit | Dividend | Residual income | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Second half 2026 | 6.6% | €18.42 | €0.61 | €0.20 | -€0.45 | | 2027 | 7.5% | €18.83 | €1.41 | €0.47 | -€0.75 | | 2028 | 9.0% | €19.77 | €1.78 | €0.59 | -€0.49 | | 2029 | 10.0% | €20.95 | €2.10 | €0.70 | -€0.31 | | 2030 | 10.5% | €22.35 | €2.35 | €0.78 | -€0.22 | | 2031 | 10.5% | €23.91 | €2.51 | €0.84 | -€0.24 | Residual income is negative in every year, because even 10.5% is below an 11.5% cost of equity. The Base value is therefore **below** book value, not above it: €18.42 of starting book, less €1.93 for the present value of the shortfall through 2031, less €2.48 for the terminal value (a justified price to book of 0.82 times on €25.59 of end-2031 book value) gives **€14.01**, or 0.76 times book. Only the Bull path earns above the cost of equity. ### Sensitivity: value per share, cost of equity against long-run return on equity | Plateau return on equity \ cost of equity | 10.5% | 11.5% | 12.5% | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 7.0% | €9.2 | €7.9 | €7.0 | | 8.5% | €12.5 | €10.8 | €9.4 | | 10.0% | €16.0 | €13.8 | €12.0 | | 11.5% | €19.8 | €16.9 | €14.7 | | 13.0% | €23.7 | €20.3 | €17.6 | Each row ramps from today's return to the plateau by 2030 and uses the plateau as the terminal return. The price of €8.68 is reached at a plateau of about 7.4% and a cost of equity of 11.5%. The 10.0% row differs slightly from the Base because the Base peaks at 10.5% before settling at 10.0%. ## Secondary valuation: forward earnings For the second method I apply a price to earnings multiple to next-twelve-months earnings per share, which I estimate at **€1.36**: half of my second half 2026 figure for the fourth quarter plus three quarters of 2027. A multiple of 8x is my assumption (ESTIMATED), tested at 6x and 10x. It gives **€10.90** (€8.18 at 6x and €13.63 at 10x). At €8.68 the shares trade at 6.4 times that figure and 6.8 times trailing earnings of €1.27. A peer table and a synchronized multiple history are not available from free sources, so I do not use them. This method is not independent of the first: both use the same earnings path, and the multiple is a judgment. Its value is that it does not depend on the terminal assumptions and so asks less of the recovery. ## Growth diagnostics The growth valuation cross-check (SM-19) does not apply in the usual way, because earnings per share for a bank swing with credit costs, tax and rates, and a PEG ratio is not a bank metric. Cyclical distortion: medium. Free cash flow growth (SM-20) is not applicable to a bank. The sector equivalent is per share value creation: book value per share rose from €17.93 at the end of 2024 to €18.24 at the end of 2025 and €18.42 in June 2026, while earnings per share for the first half fell from €0.80 to €0.65. Growth quality is structural with execution risk, estimate reliability medium. None of these diagnostics sets fair value, MOS or the verdict. ## Valuation triangulation | Method | Base value | Weight | | --- | --- | --- | | Primary: residual income model | €14.01 | 70% | | Secondary: 8x next-twelve-months earnings | €10.90 | 30% | | Triangulated Base | €13.08 | 100% | The two methods differ by 25.0%, which is in the warning range (20% to 30%). I therefore lower the valuation robustness score by one point and add 5 points to the required MOS. The weights favor the residual income model because it is the method designed for banks. Analyst price targets do not enter the Base. Bear and Bull come from the residual income model only, because the secondary method was built for the Base case. ## What is the market already pricing in? At €8.68 the shares trade at 0.47 times book value and 0.50 times tangible book value. With a cost of equity of 11.5% and growth of 3%, a justified price to book of 0.47 corresponds to a return on equity of **7.0% forever**. In the model, the price equals a plateau return of about 7.4%. In other words the market assumes that today's return, which still benefits from a cost of risk of 22 basis points against a planned 30 to 35, is both permanent and the best case. My Base case needs the return to rise by about 3.5 percentage points, from the cost-income ratio falling toward the mid-60s and operating leverage on a loan book that grows 12% to 15% a year. The data point that would show it is a falling cost-income ratio at a stable cost of risk. Neither has appeared yet. ## Bear, base and bull scenarios | | Bear | Base | Bull | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Main assumptions | Return stays at 6.0%: cost of risk rises to 30 to 35 bp, costs keep pace, Ukrainian tax stays at 50% | Return rises to 10.5% by 2030 on partial efficiency gains | Management's 13% to 14% reached by 2030, cost-income ratio near 57% | | Return path, 2027 / 2029 / 2031 | 6.0% / 6.0% / 6.0% | 7.5% / 10.0% / 10.5% | 9.0% / 13.0% / 13.5% | | Cost of equity / terminal growth | 11.5% / 3.0% | 11.5% / 3.0% | 11.5% / 3.0% | | Terminal return | 6.0% | 10.0% | 13.0% | | Value per share | €5.98 | €13.08 | €21.11 | | Price to book at that value | 0.32x | 0.71x | 1.15x | | Versus €8.68 | -31.2% | +50.7% | +143.2% | I assign no probabilities. Each case holds the cost of equity at 11.5%, so the Bear is not a collapse: it keeps the book value intact and simply never earns its cost of capital. The Bull value rests almost entirely on the terminal value. The payoff is asymmetric (a 31% fall against a 143% rise), but the Base case, not the Bull case, sets the buy price. ## How the buy price is set A Confidence C score carries a base MOS of 40%. I add 5 points for the geopolitical and tax risk in Ukraine and Eastern Europe, and 5 points because the two valuation methods differ by 25%. I give no credit for the low price to book value, since that is the very thing being tested. The required MOS is **50%**. Applied to the Base of €13.08, the **maximum buy price is €6.54** (0.37 times tangible book), and a 60% margin marks a strong-buy reference at €5.23. At €8.68 the shares trade above the buy zone. ## Dividend and capital return The dividend approved in June 2026 was €0.47 a share (about €27.7 million), a yield of 5.4% at the current price. The policy is to pay one third of profit attributable to ordinary shareholders. Applied to my estimate of 2026 earnings of about €1.24 a share, next year's dividend would be about €0.41, a yield of 4.8%, and the AT1 coupon of about €12 million a year ranks ahead of it. This is an income support, not a growth thesis. ## Reasons to own PCZ - **The price implies no improvement.** At 0.47 times book, the market pays for a 7% return in perpetuity. - **Margin and volume are moving the right way.** Net interest income rose 11.6% and net interest margin reached 3.3%, with growth in higher-yielding micro and retail segments. - **Operating leverage is possible.** A cost-income ratio of 71% against a target near 57% leaves a lot to gain if digital investment starts to scale. - **Strong liquidity and adequate capital.** Liquidity coverage of 155% and CET1 2.3 points above the requirement. - **A steady payout.** One third of profit, about 5% yield today. ## What could go wrong? - **Thesis breaker: the return does not recover.** If the return on equity stays at 7% to 8%, the discount to book is deserved. - **Cost of risk.** At 22 basis points it is below the 30 to 35 that management itself assumes for its targets, and Stage 2 loans are up 41% in six months. - **Capital.** Loan growth of 12% to 15% with a one third payout strains the CET1 ratio, and the year-end guide depends on the Ecuador sale and other measures. - **Taxes and perimeter.** Ukraine's 50% tax rate, Romania's bank levy, and a loss on the Ecuador sale of high single to low double digit millions. - **Funding mix.** Loans grew 8.0% against deposit growth of 2.2%; the loan to deposit ratio of 89.6% is close to the 90% mark where liquidity risk rises. - **Currency and geopolitics.** The translation reserve is minus €110.9 million, and the group has operations in Ukraine and the Western Balkans. ## Management execution Management has delivered loan growth, net interest margin expansion, a successful AT1 issue and the roll-out of mobile apps in seven banks, and it has kept the 2026 outlook. The offsets are an earlier cut to its 2025 return guidance, a cost-income ratio that is not yet improving, and targets that depend on an unproven jump in efficiency. **Assessment: 12/20, acceptable but unproven. The next test is the third quarter report and any update of the 2027 outlook.** ## Stock Analyza scorecard | Economic classification (bank) | Score | | --- | --- | | Return on tangible equity against cost of equity | 0/2 | | Book value per share and dividend growth | 1/2 | | Deposit franchise and funding | 1/2 | | Capital strength | 1/1 | | Credit quality | 0/1 | | Recurring franchise | 1/2 | | Reinvestment runway | 1/2 | | Total: Standard | 5/12 | The first draft scored 8/12, which sits in the Quality Growth range, and then kept a Standard discipline in words. The score now follows the evidence: runway earns full points only with proof of high returns on new capital, deposit growth lags loan growth, and credit quality is in the yellow zone rather than the green one. Business quality is **56/100**: moat and franchise 13/20, return versus cost of equity 5/20, balance sheet and resilience 10/15, earnings and asset quality 7/15, growth and runway 10/15, management and capital allocation 7/10, governance and dilution 4/5. The valuation score is **53/100**: discount to Base 27/40 (a 33.6% discount against a 50% requirement), protection against the Bear case 5/20, agreement between methods 8/15, historical valuation 4/10, market expectations 7/10, data and model quality 2/5. ## Confidence score | Confidence | Score | | --- | --- | | Data quality / source provenance | 4/5 | | Predictability | 3/5 | | Valuation robustness | 2/5 | | Accounting transparency | 3/5 | | Scenario dispersion | 2/5 | | Total | 14/25, grade C | Reporting is timely and the interim report carries an auditor's review. The grade is held down by a model that depends on a return path I had to estimate, a 25% gap between two methods, management overlays and deferred tax assets in Ukraine that rely on assumptions, and a range of €5.98 to €21.11 between Bear and Bull. ## What I would watch from here ### Green - Return on tangible equity above 10% and rising - Cost-income ratio below 65% - CET1 ratio at or above 13% with loan growth on plan - Defaulted loans below 2% - Cost of risk at or below 30 basis points - Net interest margin at or above 3.3% - Ecuador sale closed without a larger loss ### Yellow - Return on tangible equity of 8% to 10% - Cost-income ratio of 65% to 70% - CET1 ratio of 12% to 13% - Defaulted loans of 2% to 4%, or Stage 2 share rising - Cost of risk of 30 to 50 basis points - Loan to deposit ratio of 85% to 90% - Net interest margin of 3.0% to 3.3% ### Red - Return on equity persistently below 8% - Cost-income ratio above 70% - CET1 ratio below 12% or a payout cut to protect capital - Defaulted loans above 4% and rising - Cost of risk above 70 basis points without a shock - Loan to deposit ratio above 90% - Net interest margin below 3.0% Today two readings are red: return on equity (6.7%, with a return on tangible equity of 7.3%) and the cost-income ratio (71.2%). Yellow are CET1 (12.7%), defaulted loans (2.9%), the Stage 2 share (8.5%, up from 6.5%), Stage 3 coverage (41.3%, down from 44.5%) and the loan to deposit ratio (89.6%). Green are the net interest margin (3.3%) and the cost of risk (22 basis points, though below the 30 to 35 that management plans for). The next review points are the third quarter report (date not verified) and the closing of the Ecuador sale. ## The three most important thesis breakers 1. The return on equity stays below about 9% as the digital transformation matures. 2. CET1 falls toward 12% while loan growth continues, forcing slower growth or a lower payout. 3. Credit quality weakens: defaulted loans above 4% with a rising cost of risk. ## Adversarial review I recomputed every figure from the June 30, 2026 interim report and the first half release, rebuilt the valuation as an explicit residual income model, and checked the price against the Xetra record. The reported figures reconcile. The corrections were in the price, the book value inputs, the scenario values, the triangulation, the MOS and the scores. | Item | First draft | Corrected | | --- | --- | --- | | Price | €8.79 from an aggregator, not a verified close | €8.68, Xetra close of October 5, 2026 | | Book value | €18.5 from the Q1 presentation; tangible book called unavailable | €18.42 and €17.52 tangible, from the June 30 interim report | | Bear value | €9.25, which is above the price (+5.2%) | €5.98 from an explicit path (return 6.0%), 31% below the price | | Base primary value | €16.40 with an unspecified "execution haircut" | €14.01 from a year by year residual income model | | Bull value | €20.80 in the summary and €21 to €23 in the text | €21.11 from an explicit path | | Secondary value | €14.90 from a "normalized" EPS of €1.45 to €1.65 at 9x to 10x | €10.90 from €1.36 next-twelve-months EPS at 8x | | Analyst targets | 20% weight on a midpoint of €15.75 | Removed from the valuation | | Method divergence | 9.6%, pass | 25.0%, warning (MOS +5 points) | | Triangulated Base | €15.80 | €13.08 | | Required MOS | 35%, including minus 5 points for the "deep book discount" | 50%: base 40, plus 5 geopolitical, plus 5 divergence, no credit for the discount | | Maximum buy price | €10.27, price "inside the buy zone" | €6.54, price above the buy zone | | Bank red flags | Not applied | Return below 8% and cost-income ratio above 70% are both active | | Return on equity basis | 6.7% quoted without the AT1 effect | Return on tangible equity 7.3% and a €12 million a year AT1 coupon noted | | Stage 2 loans | Not mentioned | +41% to €713 million (8.5%), including €114.8 million Middle East exposures | | Defaulted loans threshold | Green below 3% | Green below 2%, 2% to 4% yellow (framework levels) | | Economic classification | 8/12 | 5/12, Standard | | Business quality | 62/100 | 56/100 (return versus cost of equity 5/20) | | Valuation score | 88/100 | 53/100 | | Confidence | 19/25, grade B | 14/25, grade C | | Verdict | Buy at €8.79 | Hold at €8.68, watchlist for new money | Every correction lowers the value, the scores or the verdict. I found no correction that moves up, and the price itself was 1.3% lower than the draft's. The strongest counter-thesis, for the bulls: a bank at 0.47 times book with a 33% payout, a growing loan book and a visible path to a 13% return is simply mispriced, and the Bull value is €21. The response is that this is the Bull case, and that the framework's own rule for banks below 0.8 times tangible book is to wait for a return above 10%. | Robustness check | Triangulated value | | --- | --- | | Central Base | €13.08 | | Generous: cost of equity 10.5%, return to 11.5%, 10x earnings | €17.93, +106.5% | | Conservative: cost of equity 12.5%, return to 8.5%, 6x earnings | €9.04, +4.1% | | Cost of equity 10.5% / 12.5% | €14.68 / €11.82 | | Return plateau 8.5% instead of 10.5% | €10.80 | | Cost of risk at 35 basis points (return 0.7 points lower every year) | €11.63 | | Tangible book basis (intangibles of €0.90 deducted) | €12.18 | | Secondary at 6x / 10x earnings | €12.26 / €13.90 | | Maximum buy price at the first draft's 35% margin of safety | €8.50, still below €8.68 | The verdict is Hold in the central and conservative cases. In the generous case the maximum buy price would be €8.96, above today's price, and the verdict would be Buy. Audit flags: the cost of equity, the return paths, the 8x multiple, next-twelve-months EPS and the AT1 coupon rate are my estimates. A peer table, a synchronized valuation history and collateral coverage were not available. The October 6 close was not available when this was written, so the price is the October 5 Xetra close; on October 6 Xetra traded near €8.72 in the afternoon. The publication gate status is PASS WITH WARNING because the valuation depends on a return recovery that has not yet appeared. ## Final verdict: hold at €8.68, watchlist for new money ProCredit has a real franchise, growing margins, solid liquidity and a share price at half of book value. But the shares are cheap for a reason that the bank framework spells out: a return of 6.7% to 7.3% and a cost-income ratio above 70%. My Base value of €13.08 needs the return to rise to about 10.5%, and even then it is only 0.71 times book. With a required margin of safety of 50%, the framework buy price is €6.54. **Verdict: HOLD at €8.68. Triangulated Base value €13.08, upside 50.7%, Confidence C (14/25). Required margin of safety 50%, maximum buy price €6.54.** The valuation alone classifies as Deep Undervalued, which would be a Strong Buy, but the verdict is lowered for the active red flags and the negative character change of a costly transformation with returns below the cost of equity, and the price is above the buy zone. New money waits for €6.54 or below, or for evidence that the return is moving above 9% to 10% with a stable cost of risk and CET1 at or above 13%. Existing holders are paid a 5% yield while they wait. The main thesis breaker is a sustainable return on equity that stays below about 9% while the balance sheet keeps growing. ## More analyses on Patreon This analysis is free. Premium members get every in-depth analysis, the full archive and a vote on which stocks get analyzed next: https://www.patreon.com/stockanalyza ## Sources Primary sources include ProCredit Holding's [interim report as of June 30, 2026](https://www.procredit-holding.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Q2-2026-Interim-Report.pdf), the [first half 2026 press release of August 13, 2026](https://www.procredit-holding.com/2026/08/13/procredit-h1-2026-strategy-execution-yields-strong-and-targeted-loan-growth-amid-increased-net-interest-margin/) and the first quarter 2026 results. The Xetra price record comes from [onvista](https://www.onvista.de/aktien/handelsplaetze/PROCREDIT-HOLDING-AG-CO-KGAA-Aktie-DE0006223407). The reference market price is the October 5, 2026 Xetra close of €8.68. A price of €8.79 from an aggregator could not be matched to a venue close. Book value per share is the June 30, 2026 equity attributable to ordinary shareholders of €1,084.9 million divided by 58,898,492 shares. The cost of equity, return paths, earnings multiples, the AT1 coupon rate and the next-twelve-months earnings are analytical estimates, not company guidance. **Disclaimer.** This analysis is provided solely for research and educational purposes. It is not personalized investment, financial, legal or tax advice. ProCredit is exposed to credit, currency, tax and geopolitical risk in Eastern Europe including Ukraine, to regulatory capital limits, and to execution risk in its strategy, and its shares are thinly traded and volatile. Investors can lose part or all of their invested capital. Framework: SF-02 Banks. Economic class: Standard. Engine: residual income with a forward earnings cross-check. Confidence: C/14. Data status and adversarial gate: PASS\_WITH\_WARNING. Version: Master v3.3.