NCR Voyix: a $205 million cash flow guide, and $14 million that reaches owners

NCR Voyix guides to $190 to $220 million of adjusted free cash flow for 2026, which is 21% of its $987 million market value. That figure leaves out the restructuring cash the company spends every year, pension and environmental payments, and stock pay. Take those out and I estimate about $14 million reaches owners in 2026. The reported number, operating cash flow minus capital expenditure, was minus $375 million in 2025, minus $349 million in 2024 and minus $28 million over the last twelve months. The stock is cheap on EBITDA, at 4.7 times, and expensive on the cash that is left after the costs that never seem to end.

At the October 9, 2026 close of $7.15, the shares trade 19.8% above my triangulated Base value of $5.98. The Bear value is $0.44 and the Bull value is $12.58. The required margin of safety (MOS), the discount to fair value I need before buying, is 60%, so the maximum buy price is $2.39, 67% below today's price. The price is not far from fair value. The case against buying is that the cash flow that would justify it has not yet appeared in a reported number.

Route: SF-01 standard value. SF-07 does not apply: pro forma revenue growth is about 1% and only a third of revenue is recurring software. Subtype: retail and restaurant point-of-sale software, services and payments, in a multi-year restructuring. Economic classification: Standard (2/12). Primary method: normalized owner free cash flow (after interest, taxes, recurring restructuring cash, pension and environmental cash and stock pay) times a free cash flow multiple, less preferred stock. Secondary method: a scenario cash flow model (DCF) at 12%. Cross-check: an enterprise value to EBITDA lens, not weighted. Values are present fair value estimates, not 12 month price targets.

What NCR Voyix is

NCR Voyix sells the software, services and payments that run checkout and the restaurant floor: Aloha for restaurants, a retail platform for grocers and convenience stores, self-checkout and payments. It has about 85,000 platform sites (up 10%) and more than 8,500 payment sites (up 2%). Revenue was $2,687 million in 2025. Recurring revenue was $1,676 million, 62% of the total, and in the second quarter it was $435 million, 83% of revenue, because hardware sales are now out of the base. The company was split in 2023 (NCR Atleos was spun off) and sold its Digital Banking business in September 2024, which paid down debt.

Three facts define the setup:

• Hardware is now outsourced. From April 1, 2026, Ennoconn designs, builds and ships the hardware, and NCR Voyix books a net commission in service revenue. Second quarter product revenue fell from $185 million to $27 million, and total revenue fell 21%, but pro forma for the change revenue rose 1% ($523 million against $520 million). Margins look better because low-margin hardware left: adjusted EBITDA margin was 18.7% against 14.1%.
• EBITDA is growing, slowly. Adjusted EBITDA was $425 million in 2025 (+22%) and the 2026 guide is $432 to $447 million (+3% to +7%). The February outlook was $440 to $455 million, so the range has come down by $8 million.
• The stock has fallen. The shares started 2026 at $10.19 and the 52-week range is $6.02 to $12.09. At $7.15 they are 41% below the high and 19% above the low.

The latest quarter

The second quarter looks fine on the adjusted lines and flat underneath. GAAP operating income was $14 million. Net income was $2 million, but net loss per share was $0.01 after preferred dividends. The first half includes a $40 million income tax benefit; the pre-tax result was a loss.

Three things stand out. First, Restaurants adjusted EBITDA fell from $68 million to $58 million in the quarter and from $127 million to $112 million in the half, even as its margin rose, so the larger Retail margin gain is partly a hardware accounting effect. Second, the company reports a new metric, remaining contract value, of $286 million (+65%), and the second quarter release does not give annual recurring revenue; the fourth quarter release gave $1.7 billion (UNAVAILABLE now). Third, the first-half operating cash flow of $59 million was helped by $42 million from inventory and by the hardware sale to Ennoconn: $123 million of inventory was sold, $108 million of receivables recorded, $67 million collected, so $41 million is still to come (my arithmetic).

The balance sheet at June 30: cash of $237 million and long-term debt of $1,101 million, which gives net debt of $864 million. At December 31, 2025 net debt was $874 million and the company calculated adjusted net leverage of 2.1 times. The next report is estimated for November 5, 2026 (a data site estimate; I have not seen the company's announcement).

Why the free cash flow guide is the wrong number to stop at

The company's adjusted free cash flow starts from operating cash flow minus capex and then adds back several items. For 2025 the walk was published: it started at minus $375 million and reached plus $27 million, and a further $109 million of restructuring cash takes it to the $136 million "before restructuring" figure that the 2026 guide of $190 to $220 million is compared with.

The Digital Banking tax was a true one-off. The other items are not. Restructuring, transformation and strategic costs were $124 million in 2025 on the income statement and $63 million in the first half of 2026, up from $46 million, and the company has booked such costs every year since the split. Pension contributions and environmental cash payments (Fox River and Kalamazoo River) continue. The environmental reserve is not in the filings I could read (UNAVAILABLE).

For 2026 I start from the middle of the guide, $205 million, and subtract about $100 million of restructuring and strategic cash (ESTIMATED from the first-half run rate), $60 million of pension and environmental cash (ESTIMATED, 2025 level), and $35 million of stock pay. That leaves about $10 million, and about $14 million in the table below, which builds the same number from EBITDA. Using the guide range and a reasonable spread on the costs, the 2026 figure runs from about minus $45 million to plus $65 million.

Everything in this table is my estimate except the 2026 EBITDA guide midpoint. The path is built from three beliefs: EBITDA grows about 3% a year (pro forma revenue roughly flat, Retail margin gains continuing); restructuring cash halves by 2028 and then stays at $45 million, about 2% of revenue, because a company that rebuilds its platform does not stop spending; and pension and environmental cash falls slowly. Net interest is $55 million on $1.1 billion of debt (2025 net interest was $52 million, and interest income has almost disappeared). Capex is $145 to $150 million, a bit below the $161 million of the last twelve months and the $165 million of 2025.

Debt, preferred stock and shares

The preferred stock matters. Non-GAAP earnings per share are calculated on 150.4 million shares, 12.6 million more than the 137.8 million GAAP count, which is the preferred stock as converted. At $7.15 that conversion is worth about $90 million, well below the $207 million carrying value, so the holders would not convert, and I treat the preferred as a claim ahead of common shareholders. The terms (liquidation preference, dividend, conversion price) are UNAVAILABLE. The gap between net income and per-share loss implies preferred dividends of roughly $13 million a year (ESTIMATED). The company redeemed $74 million of the preferred in the fourth quarter of 2025.

I use 138.07 million common shares (cover page, July 29, 2026). In the first half the company repurchased $20 million of stock, and the board added $178 million of authority in February, bringing the total to $300 million at that time (the remaining amount is UNAVAILABLE). The company bought back stock in a half-year in which my estimate of owner free cash flow was negative, and I count that as weak capital allocation, though the amount is small.

Primary valuation: normalized owner free cash flow times a multiple

The framework classifies NCR Voyix as a Standard company (SM-12 score 2/12) and routes it to the SF-01 free cash flow method. That method multiplies normalized free cash flow per share by a multiple chosen from three tiers: 8 to 10 times for cyclical or risky cash flows, 10 to 12 times for average stable ones, 12 to 15 times for very stable growing ones. For leveraged companies the framework says to anchor on owner earnings after maintenance capital expenditure, not on adjusted free cash flow. I use the 2028E owner free cash flow as the normalized figure, because by then the restructuring cash has halved, and I take multiples of 9, 10 and 11 times for the Bear, Base and Bull. The beta of 1.57 and cash flow variance above 30% point to the first tier; leverage of 2.0 times and a reasonable competitive position point to the second, so 10 times, the boundary, is the Base. The multiple rises one turn in the Bull because cash flow would then grow more than 10% a year, as the framework allows.

The formula: equity value equals 2028E owner free cash flow times the multiple, minus $207 million of preferred stock. Debt is already in the cash flow through interest, so net debt is not subtracted again. Per share equals equity divided by 138.07 million shares.

The Bear shows what leverage does: owner cash flow of $27 million is worth $243 million at 9 times, and the preferred stock takes $207 million of it. A free cash flow multiple is unstable when the cash flow is this small, so the Bear is a floor-type figure, not a forecast. Sensitivity of the primary value ($ per share) to the multiple and the 2028E owner free cash flow:

Each $10 million of normalized owner free cash flow is worth about $0.72 a share at 10 times. Because the cash flow is a small difference between large numbers (EBITDA of $470 million against $370 million of costs), small changes in the costs move the value a lot.

Secondary valuation: scenario cash flow model

The primary method values a single normalized year. The cash flow model walks the owner free cash flow from 2026 to 2030, then applies a terminal growth rate. The discount rate is 12%, the cost of equity for a stock with a beta of 1.57, since the cash flows are after interest and go to common and preferred holders. Terminal growth is 1.5% in the Base (0% Bear, 2.5% Bull). The first-half 2026 owner cash flow is estimated at minus $45 million, so the second half contributes about $58 million to reach the 2026 figure in the table (ESTIMATED; the company does not disclose first-half adjusted free cash flow). The preferred stock is deducted at $207 million.

Base equity value before preferred is $1,080 million, of which the terminal value is 67%. Less $207 million of preferred and divided by 138.07 million shares: $6.33. The Bear gives $0.70 and the Bull $13.62.

The two methods share the same owner cash flow path, so they are not fully independent, and agreement between them is built in. What differs is the treatment of the years after 2028: the primary method capitalizes 2028 at a single multiple, the cash flow model discounts each year and a terminal value. The stress test: with owner free cash flow 20% lower from 2028 on, the cash flow model gives $4.93 and the primary method $4.29; 40% lower, $3.53 and $2.85.

History and growth diagnostics

The data site shows 2024 operating cash flow of minus $132 million; the company's 2025 release gives minus $121 million, so the 2024 free cash flow is minus $338 million to minus $349 million. The business was reshaped over these years (a spin-off in 2023, the Digital Banking sale in 2024), so revenue and cash flow before 2024 are not like for like, and revenue fell from $3,692 million to $2,687 million (a 7.6% annual decline) largely through disposals.

Free cash flow growth (SM-20). Free cash flow was negative in 2024, 2025 and the last twelve months, so a growth rate has no starting point: not meaningful. Classification: UNCERTAIN, with LOW_BASE_DISTORTION in any growth figure off 2025. The company's adjusted free cash flow of $136 million in 2025 to $205 million in 2026E (+40% to +62%) is growth off a number that excludes restructuring cash. The yield on today's $987 million market value is 20.8% on the company's guide, 1.4% on my 2026E owner cash flow and 10.1% on my normalized 2028E. Forecast reliability: LOW. Estimate dispersion and revisions are UNAVAILABLE.

PEG (SM-19). The price to earnings is 25.5 on GAAP earnings of $0.41 a share and the PEG shown by the broker data is 0.48 (Morningstar, as of October 11, 2026). GAAP earnings fell 94% because 2024 included the gain on the Digital Banking sale, and non-GAAP earnings per share are flat ($0.90 in 2025, $0.89 to $0.92 guided for 2026). A growth rate off a gain, or off a flat number, gives a meaningless ratio: PEG_NOT_MEANINGFUL, and ACCOUNTING_BASIS_MISMATCH between GAAP and non-GAAP. The data site's forward price to earnings of about 7 is on adjusted earnings. Growth durability: NORMALIZING. CYCLICAL_DISTORTION: LOW, with no cyclical reason. The PEG is a diagnostic and does not set the Base, the margin of safety or the verdict.

Cash flow quality gate (SM-08). The gate is the weak point. Operating cash flow minus capex was negative in two of the last three years and the company's own adjusted figure leaves out about $190 million of recurring cash costs in 2025 (restructuring $109 million, environmental $37 million, pension $26 million, and $29 million of smaller items I accepted). The gate passes only on the owner free cash flow I constructed, not on the reported numbers, so I set the cash and earnings quality score at 3 out of 15.

Valuation triangulation

The two Base values differ by 9.8% and the Bull values by 13.6%. In the Bear both are close to zero ($0.26 and $0.70) and a percentage divergence is not meaningful. I weight the primary method 60% because it follows the framework's SF-01 route and uses the hardest cash flow measure. I weight the cash flow model 40% because it carries the path but 67% of its Base value is terminal. A 50/50 split gives $6.03 and a 70/30 split $5.92, so the weighting moves the Base by about six cents.

An enterprise value to EBITDA lens points the other way, and I show it so the reader can weigh it. It is not weighted, because EBITDA leaves out the cash costs above. At 2027E EBITDA of $455 million, with net debt, preferred stock and the pension deficit deducted, the value per share is:

The market pays 4.8 times 2027E EBITDA on that definition and my Base implies 4.4 times. A buyer who believed the restructuring cash would end, and who paid 6 times, would value the stock at $11.15. I had no verified peer table, so I cannot say what a fair multiple is for this mix of software, services and payments (UNAVAILABLE). The difference between my Base and that lens is the whole debate: how much of the $190 million of annual cash costs outside EBITDA ever goes away.

What is the market already pricing in?

Market value is $987 million, enterprise value with the preferred stock is $2,058 million, and with the pension deficit it is $2,178 million. The market is not pricing in a collapse and it is not pricing in a full recovery either. To justify $7.15 at 10 times, the 2028E owner free cash flow has to be about $119 million, against my $100 million. In EBITDA terms, with my cost estimates unchanged, that is about $489 million in 2028, against my $470 million and a 2026 guide midpoint of $440 million. Or my Base cash flow path has to be about 12% higher in every year in the cash flow model.

The last line is the point. If the company's own number of $205 million were what reached owners, the stock would be worth almost twice the price. The market is pricing in something between that number and mine, and the likeliest reading is that it expects a partial roll-off of the restructuring and legacy cash costs.

Bear, base and bull scenarios

These are scenarios, not probabilities, and not one-year targets. I publish no probability-weighted return because I cannot support the weights. The Bear is not a bankruptcy forecast: it is a case where the cash costs stay and a thin layer of common equity sits behind $864 million of debt and $207 million of preferred stock. At 4 times EBITDA the same Bear would be worth $3.54 on the EBITDA lens, which I do not count. One assumption at a time on the Base primary value of $5.74:

The tests are large relative to the value: a $30 million change in a single cost line swings the Base by about $2. That is the reason for the low confidence score.

How the buy price is set

A Confidence score of 6/25 is grade D, which starts the MOS at 50%. I add 10 points for accounting opacity: the company's adjusted free cash flow excludes recurring costs, there is no reconciliation of the 2026 guide, and reported free cash flow differs from it by hundreds of millions. I add nothing for leverage (net debt of 2.0 times EBITDA, with the next large maturity in 2028), nothing for concentration or cyclicality, and nothing for divergence (9.8% in the Base). The result is 60%, at the framework's ceiling, so a price is still issued, but only just.

Maximum buy price: $5.98 times (1 - 0.60) = $2.39. At that price the market value would be $330 million, 3.3 times my 2028E Base owner free cash flow. The price today is 199% above that level, so the verdict is Hold, not Buy. The Base value is only 16.4% below the price, which would make it a Hold even without the margin of safety, but the shares are not in the buy zone.

Dividend and capital return

NCR Voyix pays no common dividend. It paid preferred dividends of roughly $13 million a year (ESTIMATED) and redeemed $74 million of the preferred in late 2025. Buybacks were $83 million in 2025 and $20 million in the first half of 2026. Neither valuation assumes buybacks; stock pay is deducted in full, so credit for buybacks would count the same cash twice.

Reasons to own VYX

• EBITDA is rising. Adjusted EBITDA grew 22% in 2025 and the first half of 2026 is up 5%.
• It is cheap on the adjusted lines. Enterprise value is 4.7 times 2026E adjusted EBITDA and the company guides to a 21% free cash flow yield, before restructuring.
• The cash drag may be ending. The Digital Banking tax of $284 million is paid, and operating cash flow turned positive in the first half ($59 million against minus $284 million).
• The installed base is large. About 85,000 platform sites, up 10%, and new wins such as a platform contract with more than 200 Pizza Ranch restaurants and a multi-year agreement with Rutter's.
• Recurring software is growing. Recurring software revenue grew 6% in the second quarter, and remaining contract value is up 65% to $286 million.
• The hardware burden is gone. The Ennoconn arrangement removes inventory and about $41 million of receivables are still to be collected.

The Bull value of $12.58 assumes EBITDA of $505 million and restructuring cash of $30 million by 2028. It needs the cost roll-off and some growth together.

What could go wrong?

• Thesis breaker: the cash costs do not roll off. If restructuring cash stays at $80 million in 2028, the Base primary value falls to $3.57.
• EBITDA misses. The 2026 range has already come down by $8 million since February. At 2028E EBITDA of $440 million the Base primary value is $3.57.
• Restaurants profit is shrinking. Restaurants adjusted EBITDA fell 15% in the second quarter and 12% in the half.
• Debt and preferred stock rank ahead. $864 million of net debt and about $207 million of preferred stock, with $650 million of notes due in 2028. The covenant terms and the revolver size are UNAVAILABLE; the company borrowed and repaid $103 million on the revolver in the first half.
• Operational and control events. A ransomware incident has cost $47 million in total ($37 million recovered from insurance), and fraudulent bank transfers have totaled $34 million (about $16 million recovered so far), according to the quarterly filing.
• Reporting changes. The company now reports remaining contract value instead of annual recurring revenue, and its adjusted free cash flow guide has no reconciliation.
• Reliance on a partner. Ennoconn now designs, builds and ships the hardware, and the company is an agent for those sales.
• Volatility. The shares fell 29.8% from the start of the year. A market value of under $1 billion with a beta of 1.57 can move a long way on one report.

I assign no probability to any of these, and the price does not prove they are all discounted.

Management execution

The record is mixed. Management completed the spin-off, sold Digital Banking for about $2.5 billion and repaid $2.1 billion of debt in 2024, and has grown adjusted EBITDA from $348 million to $425 million in a year. Against that, it has booked restructuring and transformation costs every year, free cash flow has been negative for two years, guidance for 2026 EBITDA has been lowered once, the company has had a ransomware incident and fraudulent bank transfers, and it bought back stock while owner cash flow was negative. Insiders hold about 0.5% of the shares (data site). A longer guidance history is UNAVAILABLE. Assessment: 8/20 on the framework's credibility scale, mixed to low. The next test is the third quarter report, estimated for November 5, and a clear second-half free cash flow figure that reconciles to the cash flow statement.

Character change (SM-09): the hardware transition is a real change in the business model, from a hardware seller to a software, services and commission business. It lifts margins and removes working capital, and I do not treat it as negative, so the verdict is not lowered. It also makes year-over-year revenue comparisons less useful until the second quarter of 2027.

Stock Analyza scorecard

A zero for missing proof is an evidence penalty, not a claim that returns are zero. Business quality is 32/100:

The valuation score is 26/100:

Both scores are low, and for different reasons. The business is average to weak on returns and cash conversion, and the price is a little above what I think the cash flow supports. Neither is alarming. The shares are not obviously mispriced in either direction on the Base, and the range around the Base is very wide.

Confidence score

The company's reports are primary and current, but I could not read the debt note, the preferred stock terms or the environmental reserve. Predictability is low because the business has reorganized three times in three years. Robustness is low because the owner free cash flow is a small difference between large numbers. Transparency is low because the guided cash flow measure has no reconciliation. Dispersion is extreme, $0.44 to $12.58. The score reflects my ability to forecast, not a view that the company is failing.

What I would watch from here

On the evidence I have, restructuring costs are red today: $63 million in the first half is a $126 million annual pace. Net debt at 2.0 times 2025 EBITDA is on the yellow line, pro forma revenue growth of 1% is yellow, and my 2026E owner free cash flow of about $14 million is yellow. The 2026 EBITDA guide midpoint of $440 million is yellow. Recurring software revenue growth of 6% is green. The next hard date is the third quarter report, estimated for November 5, 2026.

The three most important thesis breakers

1. The cash costs do not roll off. Restructuring, pension and environmental cash together are about $210 million a year in 2026E against EBITDA of $440 million; if they stay above $140 million in 2028, owner free cash flow stays under $60 million and the Base falls toward $3.
2. EBITDA stops growing. Retail margin gains are partly accounting, and Restaurants EBITDA is already down. A 2028E EBITDA of $440 million rather than $470 million takes the Base primary value to $3.57.
3. On the upside, the third quarter report shows restructuring costs falling below $15 million a quarter and a second-half free cash flow that reconciles to the cash flow statement. Then 2028E owner free cash flow of $120 million or more is visible, and the price is justified.

Adversarial review

I built this analysis from the company's filings and checked it in two passes. Inputs were read from the second quarter 2026 earnings release (results, guidance, segments, balance sheet, share counts, adjusted EBITDA reconciliation), the Form 10-Q for the quarter (cash flow statement, debt excerpt, leases, share repurchases, ODM transition, litigation; the later notes were cut off in the copy I read), the fourth quarter 2025 release and call slides (the 2025 free cash flow walk, net leverage, outlook), the data site for the October 9 close, annual statements and cash flow history, and a market data page for dates and ownership. The closing price of $7.15 differs from a broker quote of $7.14 by 0.14%, so no price warning applies. Every table was recomputed from raw inputs a second time with a separate script, and the figures here reproduce.

The most important correction was conceptual. My first reading used the company's adjusted free cash flow guide as the owner cash flow, and at 10 times that gives $13.35, 87% above the price. I replaced it with owner free cash flow after restructuring, pension, environmental cash and stock pay, which gives $5.74. The correction went down. I counted no corrections up, and so I ran a bias test with the most generous reasonable combination: EBITDA of $490 million in 2027 rising to $575 million in 2030, restructuring cash of $20 million, pension and environmental cash of $30 million, a 12 times multiple, an 11% discount rate and 2.5% terminal growth. That gives a primary value of $15.71, a cash flow value of $17.61 and a triangulated $16.47, with a maximum buy price of $6.59 at the same 60% margin of safety, still below today's price. The conservative combination (EBITDA flat at $430 million, restructuring cash of $60 to $110 million, a 14% discount rate, an 8 times multiple and the pension deficit also deducted) gives about $0.02. So the verdict is sensitive to my inputs, in both directions. Under the generous case the shares at $7.15 would be 57% below fair value and a Buy by the framework's classes; under the conservative case the common equity is worth about nothing. In all three cases the maximum buy price is below or at the price. The Base is the middle of a very wide range.

The strongest case against my Base is that the restructuring and legacy costs are ending, the EBITDA lens is right, and a buyer pays 6 times for $455 million of EBITDA, which is $11.15 a share. The strongest case for a lower value is that the company has been restructuring since 2023, that Restaurants profit is already falling, and that preferred stock and debt sit ahead of the common.

The values marked as estimates are: the whole owner free cash flow path (EBITDA after 2026, capex, interest, taxes, restructuring cash, pension and environmental cash); the first-half 2026 owner cash flow of minus $45 million; the carrying amount of the preferred stock ($207 million, derived from equity lines) and its dividend; the multiples of 9, 10 and 11 times; the 12% discount rate and the terminal growth rates; the 2026 restructuring cash of $100 million; and the estimated date of the third quarter report. Not available to me: the debt note beyond the $650 million of 5.000% notes due 2028, covenant terms and revolver size, the preferred stock terms, the environmental reserve, restructuring cash paid and accrued, cash taxes, the first-half adjusted free cash flow, the reconciliation of the 2026 guide, a verified peer multiple table, a synchronized valuation history, consensus estimates, and annual recurring revenue for 2026. The net commission accounting under the Ennoconn arrangement affects year-over-year comparisons of revenue and margin.

The weakest points are the owner free cash flow path itself, where a $30 million change in one cost line moves the Base by about $2, and the preferred stock, whose terms I could not read. The publication gate status is PASS WITH WARNING: conditional research, with the verdict sensitive to inputs I could not fully verify.

Final verdict: hold at $7.15

NCR Voyix at $7.15 is priced for a partial recovery in cash conversion that has not yet shown up in a reported number. The Base of $5.98 is 16.4% below the price, but the range from $0.44 to $12.58 is so wide that the Base is not a precise estimate. A margin of safety is about being paid for being wrong, and with debt and preferred stock ahead of common and a cash flow that is a small difference between large numbers, the maximum buy price of $2.39 is where I would be paid for it.

Verdict: HOLD at $7.15. Triangulated Base value $5.98, downside 16.4%, Confidence D (6/25). Required margin of safety 60%, maximum buy price $2.39.

The company guides to $205 million of free cash flow and I count about $14 million that reaches owners, and the whole debate is how fast the difference goes away.

Sources

Primary sources include NCR Voyix's second quarter 2026 results and its earnings release exhibit (adjusted EBITDA reconciliation, guidance), the Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2026 (cash flow, debt, leases, repurchases, hardware transition, litigation), the fourth quarter and full year 2025 results and the fourth quarter 2025 call slides (the 2025 adjusted free cash flow walk, net leverage). The closing price, market value and annual history come from StockAnalysis for VYX, its income statement, cash flow and balance sheet pages, and a MarketBeat page (year-to-date price, ownership, estimated report date). Return on invested capital, beta, price to earnings and PEG are from the XTB instrument data (Morningstar), as of October 11, 2026.

The reference market price is the October 9, 2026 regular session close of $7.15. Cash, debt and balance sheet items are as of June 30, 2026, and shares are the cover page count of July 29, 2026. Third quarter results were not yet available. The owner free cash flow path, the multiples, the discount rate, terminal growth, the carrying amount of the preferred stock and the first-half owner cash flow are analytical estimates, not company guidance.